Sets two criteria that must be met for voluntary euthanasia to be permissible in a given situation: mental comptency and severe suffering.
Defines our negative rights as being the right not to be interfered with, while positive rights involve the right to be given or helped with something.
This author criticizes Singer for his two criteria to determine eligibility for euthanasia -- mental competency and severe suffering -- because some people will be denied access to a form of relief that others can have, and this is unjust/unfair.
Divides euthanasia into three categories: voluntary, involuntary, and nonvoluntary -- any of which can be active or passive forms of euthanasia.
Seeks to disprove the common view that passive euthanasia is always morally preferable, or less morally bad, than active euthanasia.
Explains why an argument for euthanasia that centers around the concept of self-determination fails, showing how the result of such an argument would end up allowing euthanasia for anyone, at any time, for any reason.
Argues that euthanasia is nearly always morally impermissible because the positive right to die is incompatible with the very foundation for our rights.
Acknowledges that we obviously have a negative right to die, since suicide isn't illegal.
Claims that nonvoluntary euthanasia must be morally fine, because we do it all the time in practices like prenatal screening and selective abortion, and find those practices acceptable.
Uses the cases of Smith & Jones (& their drowned nephews) to argue that active euthanasia and passive euthanasia *can be* morally equivalent, that sometimes there is no relevant difference between them.
There is no definitive moral difference between active and passive euthanasia.
Uses the throat cancer example to demonstrate how active euthanasia *can be* morally better/preferable to passive euthanasia.
